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Abstract 
Climate scepticism in the sense of climate denialism or contrarianism is not a new 
phenomenon, but it has recently been very much in the media spotlight. When, in November 
2009, emails by climate scientists were published on the internet without their authors‘ 
consent, a debate began in which climate sceptic bloggers used an extended network of 
metaphors to contest (climate) science. This article follows the so-called ‗climategate‘ debate 
on the web and shows how a paradoxical mixture of religious metaphors and demands for 
‗better science‘ allowed those disagreeing with the theory of anthropogenic climate change to 
undermine the authority of science and call for political inaction with regard to climate 
change. 
 
Keywords: climate scepticism, climate science, policy, metaphor, framing, religion 
 2 
I. Introduction 
"We‘ve arranged a civilization in which most crucial elements profoundly depend on 
science and technology. We have also arranged things so that almost no one 
understands science and technology. This is a prescription for disaster. We might get 
away with it for a while, but sooner or later this combustible mixture of ignorance and 
power is going to blow up in our faces." 
(Sagan, 1995: 25-26; quoted in Mooney and Kirshenbaum, 2009) 
 
At the beginning of 2009 Mike Hulme, former Director of the Tyndall Centre for climate 
change research at the University of East Anglia (UEA), UK, published a book entitled Why 
We Disagree about Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inaction and Opportunity 
(Hulme, 2009). At the end of 2009 events occurred which threw into sharp relief three of the 
key words used in the title: controversy, opportunity and inaction. Controversy arose around 
emails by climate scientists at the UEA, which had been made public on the internet at the 
end of November 2009 either by a hacker or an insider. Opportunities for mitigating climate 
change were explored at the United Nations Conference on Climate Change in Copenhagen 
(COP15), which took place at the beginning of December 2009. Heated debates about the 
emails brought to the fore profound disagreements about climate science but also, and more 
importantly, about the nature of science and the role that science plays in policy making. 
Finally, COP15 highlighted disagreements about how to share the costs of climate change 
mitigation activities amongst developing and developed nations and ended with political 
inaction. 
On Tuesday 17 November ―a substantial file including over 1000 emails either sent 
from or sent to members of the Climatic Research Unit (‗CRU‘) at the UEA, was 
downloaded on the RealClimate website, together with meteorological station data used for 
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research by CRU into the rate of the Earth‘s warming, particularly over the past 150 years, 
and other material.‖ (Press release by the UEA, 2009). In this article I study how this corpus 
of climate scientists' private emails, published on the internet without permission, was used 
by some climate sceptics to express disagreement with climate scientists who support the 
theory of anthropogenic climate change. Such disagreements are not new but the emails 
provided climate sceptics, in the sense of deniers or contrarians
1
, with a golden opportunity to 
mount a sustained effort aimed at demonstrating the legitimacy of their views. This allowed 
them to question climate science and climate policies based on it and to promote political 
inaction and inertia. As this was such an important occasion for climate sceptics to voice their 
views and challenge climate science, I want to ask: How was this disagreement discursively 
constructed or framed and what were the particular aims of this framing (i.e., the constructed 
image of climate science and scientists)? To answer these questions I examined a large 
corpus of blogs posted at the end of 2009, as most of the debate around the emails initially 
happened in the blogosphere. 
The paper first provides some background to the email scandal that came to be known 
as ‗climategate‘.2  I then give an overview of the methods and materials used to study the 
debate.  This leads into my analysis of the way that bloggers used sometimes paradoxical 
religious metaphors in conjunction with appeals to core tenets of science.  Their aim was to 
question the central results of climate science and the policies that rely on its results. Such an 
analysis is necessary given that: 
Climate-change denial could have disastrous consequences, if it delays global action to 
cut carbon emissions. Denialism is gaining popularity because people have difficulty 
differentiating deniers' twisted arguments from the legitimate concerns of genuine 
sceptics. (Kemp et al., 2010) 
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Using paradoxical religious metaphors became, for some, an integral part of their arguments.  
This paper then aims to show how such arguments provide a misleading and distorted view of 
science which deviates from genuine concern over scientific uncertainty. 
 
II. Background: ‘Climategate’ and climate scepticism 
Research carried out over decades at the UEA CRU, by its director Phil Jones and his 
collaborators, has supported the case for anthropogenic climate change. This research 
contributed to the scientific consensus on which climate change mitigation policies, such as 
those sought during COP15, are meant to be based. As mentioned above, at the end of 
November 2009 emails relating to this research appeared on the internet and triggered a 
debate about climate science in which climate change sceptics played an important role and 
in which the credibility and honesty of scientists was questioned. On 14 April 2010 a report 




There are many speculations about how the UEA CRU emails came to be published on 
the internet and about who put them there and for what reason and what prompted the timing, 
a matter of weeks before Copenhagen. What is important to note is that the emails were 
originally sent over a 15-year period ending on November 12, 2009. As soon as the emails 
were made available on the internet, the blogosphere took over their discussion, with the 
mainstream media only gradually catching up (see Figure 1 in next section). 
Bloggers focused on a few emails in which scientists had a heated debate about work 
they saw as flawed and whether it deserved to be published.  There was also discussion of 
others in which scientists discussed how to adjust data while referring to this, colloquially, as 
a ‗trick‘. Although this word is standard mathematical jargon, it was viewed with suspicion 
and led to controversy. 
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The main tenet of the online discussion, dominated by voices from the right of the 
political spectrum (see section IV), was that the emails showed that the science on which 
climate mitigation policies relied was untrustworthy.
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 Indeed discussants claimed the theory 
of anthropogenic climate change, or global warming, was a ‗scam‘, ‗conspiracy‘ or a ‗hoax‘ 
perpetrated by scientists in order to deceive the public. Scientists were portrayed as being in 
cahoots with politicians, with both reaping financial benefits. Such views permeated 
cyberspace under the name of ‗climategate‘ (and more rarely ‗warmergate‘ or ‗hackergate‘). 
Denouncing the theory of global warming as a scam or a swindle is not new. It is part 
of what Stuart Sim (2006) has called ‗special interest scepticism‘: 
The theory of global warming has its skeptics too […]. Rather than humankind being 
responsible for global warming, as most scientists in the field contend, these skeptics 
argue that it is all part of the Earth‘s natural cycle and that arguments to the contrary 
amount to a conspiracy by the scientific community to gain funding for their research 
projects: a ‗scam‘, in the words of one particularly forthright critic. Such critics are 
closer to our idea of a sceptic, but again, they are not necessarily as open-minded in 
their general outlook as we would like. This is especially so since their skepticism is 
often in the service of big business (the international oil companies, for example) […]. 
Such ‗special interest‘ scepticism has to be treated with a considerable degree of 
caution. (Sim, 2006: 10) 
Such special interest scepticism has marked debates about climate change in the US for a 
long time, had waned around 2008 when President Barack Obama was elected, but started to 
rise again in 2009 (Pew, 2009; CNN, 2009). As Jacques et al. (2008: 349) claim, this type of 
scepticism is ―a tactic of an elite-driven counter-movement designed to combat 
environmentalism‖ and may have ―contributed to the weakening of US commitment to 
environmental protection‖ (see also McCright and Dunlap, 2003). 
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‗Climategate‘ seems to have been linked to this type of scepticism and probably had 
some effect on recent public understanding of and response to climate change, although it is 
not clear how long this effect will last. As The Guardian reported in February 2010: 
Public conviction about the threat of climate change has declined sharply after months 
of questions over the science and growing disillusionment with government action, a 
leading British poll has found. The proportion of adults who believe climate change is 
"definitely" a reality dropped by 30% over the last year, from 44% to 31%, in the latest 
survey by Ipsos Mori. (Jowit, 2010) 
A survey carried out by the University of Cardiff in September and November 2009 found a 
similar trend; this seems to show that climate scepticism was not triggered but was certainly 
strengthened by ‗climategate‘ (see Chand, 2010). 
Calling the email controversy a ‗gate‘ probably contributed to this trend. The 
morpheme –gate had first been used as a label during the ‗Watergate‘ scandal and can now 
be used to refer to any scandal whatsoever usually involving some type of (suspected) cover-
up by politicians. –gate reverberates or resonates with popular imagination and cultural 
knowledge and opens up a whole narrative space or frame which allows people to easily 
structure their arguments about a controversial topic, in this instance climate change. As 
Matthew Nisbet has pointed out in his blog ―Framing Science‖, ―the now commonly used 
term ‗ClimateGate‘ (sic) to refer to the case of the East Anglia stolen emails is an extremely 
effective frame device that instantly – if not falsely – conveys that there is wrongdoing, 
politicization, and a cover-up on the part of mainstream scientists.‖ (Nisbet, 2009) The blogs 
that discussed ‗climategate‘ made good use of this little morpheme, but they also skilfully 
exploited a whole network of religious metaphors which will be the focus of this article. 
Metaphors too are, as Nisbet pointed out, ‗effective framing devices‘; even more so when 
they come in clusters and networks. Such metaphors deserve more scrutiny as they shape 
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views about science, scientists and climate change. They also shape what actions are taken, or 
not taken, based on such views. 
 
III. Methods and corpus 
Metaphors are tools for conveying novel or abstract ideas in familiar and mostly concrete 
ways. When talking about the vicissitudes of life for example, we may use the conceptual 
metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY
5
 and say, ―I have come to the end of the road…‖ or ―I have 
reached a turning point...‖. Ordinarily, the cognitive linguistic approach (see Lakoff and 
Johnson, 1980), which studies such pervasive conceptual metaphors or metaphorical 
mappings between two domains of experience (in this case: life and journeys), tended to 
focus on single sentence examples of metaphors, not whole discourses, and it tended to 
favour made-up examples, rather than examples collected in naturally occurring discourse. In 
keeping with newer trends in cognitive linguistics (see Frank et. al., 2008), I focus here on 
metaphors as part of political discourse, and collected in situ, and as having a distinctive 
social relevance. This makes metaphor analysis part of discourse analysis. Discourse is not 
limited to ‗mere talk‘ but also viewed as socially constitutive (Fairclough, 1992: 64) and as 
influencing or structuring social conduct and social perception (Webster, 2003: 89). It also 
makes metaphors part of frame analysis (which may overlap with discourse analysis), as 
metaphors constitute one of the most salient framing devices (see Entman, 1993; Nerlich et 
al., 2009). 
As early as 1644, Giambattista Vico (1948) pointed out that metaphors are like myths 
in miniature. In 1957 Roland Barthes (1970) noted that myths are not just imaginative and 
‗untrue‘ tales, but that we use them in everyday life to make sense of the world around us. 
Through such stories we structure our views of the world and make it seem ‗natural‘ or 
‗commonsensical‘ for us (see Nerlich et al., 2002). This is, to some extent, what happened in 
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the ‗climategate‘ debate. By framing or conceptualising science as religion or myth, 
opponents to the theory of AGW (anthropogenic global warming) and its political 
consequences, created their own myth or story of science as fraud or untruth. This then made 
the conclusions they drew from their stories and arguments (e.g., no political action needs to 
be taken with regards to climate change) feel natural and like common sense. As one blogger 
wrote: 
Elitists can try to smoke us with a lot of technical-sounding gobbledygook, but the 
simple facts (including the reality that theirs is 95% guesswork) along with a dash of 
common sense blows away that smokescreen and makes the picture very clear. 
No, the whole idea of anthropogenic global warming is based on a little sloppy science 
and quite a bit of fraud from people who should know better, but dont care. 
Well, we average Americans care. We care about seeing our hard-won constitutional 
freedoms annihilated under oppressive environmental regulations, and we care about 
seeing our national sovereignty sacrificed on the altar of environmental extremism. 
(Dakota Voice, 8 December) 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 185-186) note that ‖[l]ike metaphors, myths are necessary for 
making sense of what goes on around us […] just as we often take the metaphors of our own 
culture as truths, so we often take the myths of our own culture as truths‖. In our case, 
climate change science itself may be framed as a myth in the sense of Barthes. Alternatively, 
it may be framed as a myth or religion in the sense of untruth. This is a way of making sense 
of, telling ‗the truth‘ about science, based upon certain shared values and attitudes that seem 
to be threatened by science. 
This article uses a combination of discourse analysis and metaphor analysis in order 
to reveal the strategic use of metaphor as a framing device to steer social debate and generate 
expectations and beliefs (see Hart, 2008). In this case the beliefs are negative ones, about 
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climate science in particular and science in general. As the debate I wanted to study occurred 
primarily on the web, studying blogs on ‗climategate‘ seemed to be a natural way forward to 
gaining insight. There is an increasing interest in the study of blogs by discourse analysts. As 
Greg Myers (2010) has pointed out: ―if blogs are becoming important in political, social and 
economic life, we need to know how they work, just as we need to know about political 
speeches, journalism and advertisements. The persuaded have to know what the persuaders 
are doing‖ (p. 3). However, while web-based discourse analysis has advantages, mainly in 
being able to capture a debate in almost real time, it also poses challenges which are ―linked 
to the size of the web, its diversity, ephemeral quality, interactivity, and multimodality‖ 
(Mautner, 2005: 809). 
Selecting a manageable corpus for analysis was one of the major challenges. The 
choice of a search term was relatively easy, namely ‗climategate‘. However, this has some 
disadvantages having been appropriated mainly by those critiquing climate science and 
climate policy. So this framing may exclude voices that oppose the term. 
Lexis Nexis Professional, a database of newspapers, magazines and other sources,   
was the tool used for gathering the blogs. This database has traditionally been used to study 
press coverage of various debates in science and society and now also provides access to 
some blogs via Newstex (see newstex.com). ‗Newstex Blogs On Demand‘ makes available 
full-text blog content from ‗premier Weblogs‘ (creators of ‗content rich‘ blogs; see 
premierweblogs.com) in a wide variety of categories including art, career, economics, 
environment, finance, food, health, law, marketing, medical, technology, video games and 
many more. 
The period covered was one month from 18 November 2009, just before the leak of 
the emails, to 18 December, the end of COP15. Figure 1 shows the 'Google trends' graph for 




 Bloggers began discussing the CRU emails as soon as they appeared in 
the cybersphere (separate trend graphs for the US, the UK, Canada and Australia show that 
the debate began in the US a few days before the UK and elsewhere), peaked at the end of 
November and began to peter out when COP15 began. The graph also indicates that 
traditional news media were slow to jump on this particular ‗bandwagon‘, but did so mostly 
around 7
th
 December 2010 just before the opening of COP15. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
The start of this outbreak of blogging coincided with a speech by a major US climate 
change sceptic, Senator James Inhofe on 18 November, in which he, presciently, calls 2009 
―the year of the skeptic‖. He announced that he was travelling to COP15 as the leader of the 
―Truth Squad‖, that is as one of those who did not regard climate science as ‗settled‘ (Inhofe, 
2009) or in his opinion settled in the wrong way.
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 A day later, on 19 November, Anthony 
Watts first broke the story of the emails on his (award winning) blog Watts Up With That. 
This blog now has a special section devoted to ‗climategate‘.8 The term ‗climategate‘ itself 
seems to have been used first on 20 November in a blog by James Delingpole (2009), a writer 
for the UK‘s conservative newspaper The Daily Telegraph, who made this his major topic for 
blogging for several weeks. 
The corpus contains 921 blog postings (as compared to 792 traditional news articles 
in ‗All English Language News‘ for the same period), probably only a fraction of the blogs 
published on ‗climategate‘ at the end of 2009. These blogs make links to other blogs (such as 
Watts Up With That, American Thinker and James Delingpole‘s blog, which were very 
influential but are not covered by Newstex). They also link to videos, Twitter feeds, and 
Facebook.
9
 Later on links were made to articles in the mainstream media, such as The Daily 
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Mail, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Post. I did not follow these links. 
Furthermore, Newstex does not provide access to responses and threads of responses to the 
blogs. Although following these up would be valuable, this meant, for practical reasons, that I 
concentrated on the content of the blogs itself and examined them with a particular focus on 
the metaphorical framing they used. 
A first, shallow, reading of the blogs determined whether any type of metaphorical 
expression was used, and if so what kind and in what types of arguments such metaphors 
were embedded. Religious metaphors were found to play an important role in the blog 
discourses and in arguments relating to issues such as truth, evidence, certainty, consensus 
and belief. I extracted 97 passages containing metaphorical expressions relating to religion, 
faith, church and cults. These passages were then submitted to a close reading through which 
individual metaphors, metaphor clusters, groupings and ultimately overarching conceptual 
metaphors, in our case SCIENCE IS RELIGION, were extracted. At the same time the main 
arguments in which these metaphors were used were recorded, for example to challenge 
‗scientific consensus‘ or ‗truth‘ or to frame global warming as a ‗myth‘, ‗fraud‘ or 
‗conspiracy‘.  
 
IV. Analysis: Religious metaphors, paradox and paralysis 
Most of the blogs in my corpus were written by people affiliated with the conservative right, 
with a few lone voices from the so-called liberal elite sprinkled amongst them (about 10 out 
of 921). The main contribution from Europe came in the form of the blog EU Referendum, by 
Richard North, a Eurosceptic
10
. Prominent blogs from the US were PA Pundits
11
, which 
advocates the "relentless pursuit of common sense" and of ―the Truth in today‘s Mish-Mash 
World‖; Dakota Voice, which has contributors from around the US and examines local, state, 
national and world issues of interest to conservatives and Christians
12








These voices contribute to what some have called the ‗denialosphere‘, a word first 
coined to refer to those denying the theory of evolution.
15
 There are certain overlaps between 
the two cases. One where religious believers reject scientific research that contradicts their 
beliefs and accuse scientists of fundamentalism. The other where religious framing is used to 
reject scientific research which contradicts right-wing interests and to accuse scientists of a 
type of religious fundamentalism akin to extremism, socialism, and communism. Some 
‗climategate‘ bloggers may share views with creationists, but not necessarily. For example, 
the Australian geologist Ian Plimer criticises both creationism and 'climatism' (mentioned in 
PA Pundits, 24 November). Some even use creationism as yet another religious insult when 
they call scientists who claim that humans ‗create‘ global warming ‗climate creationists‘ (see 
PA Pundits, 8 December). However, in both cases, when creationists criticise evolutionary 
biologists and when climate sceptics criticise climate scientists, the phrase ‗secular religion‘ 
is used to attack science and scientists. As Stephen Jay Gould (1997) wrote: 
Our creationist detractors charge that evolution is an unproved and improvable charade 
— a secular religion masquerading as science. They claim, above all, that evolution 
generates no predictions, never exposes itself to test, and therefore stands as dogma 
rather than disprovable science. This claim is nonsense. We make and test risky 
predictions all the time; our success is not dogma, but a highly probable indication of 
evolution's basic truth. (1997: 409). 
– could one say something similar of ‗climategate‘ detractors?  Let us look in more detail at 
what climate sceptics mean by conceptualising climate science as a religious phenomenon. 
 
SCIENCE IS RELIGION 
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The Compact Oxford English Dictionary gives as one of the meanings of ‗religion‘: ―a 
particular system of faith and worship‖ and as one of the meanings of science ―a 
systematically organized body of knowledge on any subject‖. Climate sceptics generally 
mapped this meaning of religion onto this meaning of science in various ways. They claim 
that the emails show that climate scientists, rather than increasing knowledge, tried to buttress 
their fabricated system of faith and that this then destroyed the credibility and the integrity of 
science as a whole. This also meant that, according to climate sceptics, having ‗faith‘ in 
science was unwarranted, even dangerous, whereas, obviously, having faith in their own 
sceptical endeavour goes unquestioned. 
This is different from other disputes in which one party frames the other party in 
terms of ‗religion‘. For example, calling evolutionary biologists opposed to creationism 
‗fundamentalists‘, or calling environmentalism a ‗secular religion‘ (see Dyson, 2008). One 
renown instance of this type of framing is in the novel by Michael Crichton (2004), 
referenced in a blog written by RightWingNews on 9 December. Crichton describes eco-
terrorists, driven by religious fervour, attempting mass murder. 
There are then three types of religious framing which are relevant for this analysis: (i) 
where creationists use religion to denigrate biology, (ii) where critics frame the 
environmental movement as a secular religion, and (iii) where ‗climategate‘ bloggers frame 
climate science in particular and science in general as a religion.  However, these framings 
overlap. Both climate scientists ‗believing‘ in AGW and biologists ‗believing‘ in evolution 
and defending their views with conviction and authority are dismissed as religious 
fundamentalists by their opponents. The second case (environmentalism) is interesting, as 
environmentalists, that is, those who ‗believe‘ climate scientists and want to act on their 
advice, have been framed as a ‗secular religion‘ for quite a while (Dunlap, 2004), but this 
framing is now being transferred onto climate scientists and science itself. 
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In the following I shall first provide an overview of the metaphors around science and 
religion used by bloggers and then go on to discuss in more detail issues of truth, evidence 
and certainty which are discussed by bloggers using these metaphors. 
 
Dominant metaphorical framing 
Although the overall conceptual metaphor (see footnote 7) underlying some of the 
‗climategate‘ discourse can be encapsulated as SCIENCE IS RELIGION, it should be stressed that 
it subsumes other aspects of what one can call ‗religion‘ in a broad sense, such as cults, the 
church, faith and so on. These aspects of ‗religion‘ are used by the bloggers to conceptualise 
various aspects of science (e.g., scientific theories, scientists, their dissemination activities, 
the confidence they have in the results achieved, the predictions they can extrapolate from 
them, the policies based on science) in a negative way. 
Some of the most prominent examples of metaphorical expressions that exploit (and 
shape) the conceptual metaphor SCIENCE IS RELIGION in order to say something about science 
are: 
 Science (is): ―cult‖, ―fear-mongering climate-change faith-system‖. 
 Scientific theories (are): ―dogma‖, ―myth‖, ―gospel‖, ―bible‖. 
 Scientific consensus (is): ―orthodoxy‖, ―collectivism and Godism‖, ―canon‖, ―singing 
from the same hymn sheet‖. 
 Scientists (are): ―messiah‖, (confirmed, true) ―believers‖, ―zealots‖, ―prophets‖, 
―apostles‖, ―wizards and warlocks‖, ―gurus‖, ―false priests‖, ―high priests‖,  
―unchallengeable priesthood‖, ―clerics‖, ―acolytes‖, ―adherents‖, ―evangelists‖, ―the 
converted, man-made global warming illuminati‖. 
 Scientific dissemination (is): ―crusade‖, ―preaching‖. 
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 Scientific confidence (is): ―belief‖, ―religious conviction‖, ―almost religious type 
beliefs‖, ―devotion‖, ―worship‖. 
 Scientific predictions (are): ―prophecies‖, ―doomsday prophecies‖. 
 Scientists interacting with sceptics (is): ―cult in which nay-sayers must be crushed‖, 
and where sceptics are ―heretics‖, ―witches‖. 
Some of these metaphorical expressions became the basis of rather paradoxical arguments 
about science, theories, truth and evidence, consensus and certainty, and what it means for a 
scientific dispute to be settled. 
 
Theories, truth and evidence 
By framing science as religion, climate sceptics conceptualise scientific knowledge about the 
influence of human activities on the atmosphere as unassailable dogma, orthodoxy or truth, 
which cannot be questioned or shaken by new evidence. As one of them pointed out: ―No 
amount of evidence will dent the cult's belief in AGW‖ (quoted in: The Moderate Voice, 7 
December). Now, paradoxically, some climate sceptics took a very small number of casually 
written emails as conclusive evidence that the theory of AGW is not only wrong but a fraud, 
despite the fact that it is, as most scientists agree, based on a ―massive body of evidence that 
has been collected over decades by hundreds of climate scientists‖ (The Moderate Voice) or, 
as Nature put it, on ―multiple, robust lines of evidence, including several that are completely 
independent of the climate reconstructions debated in the e-mails‖ (quoted in Midwest Voice, 
14 December). 
The ‗problem‘ is that the majority of climate scientists actually think they are right 
(after having worked on the issues and theories for many years and having accumulated 
evidence). However, climate sceptics still think they are wrong and therefore accuse them of 
abandoning scientific norms and of engaging in scientific fraud. They seem cleverly to 
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project what Karl Popper called ―the wrong view of science‖ onto scientists by implying that 
they ―crave to be right‖ (Popper, 1959/2002: 281). What climate scientists consider to be the 
truth, insofar as science can ever approximate truth, their detractors frame as Truth without 
empirical foundation, that is, religious Truth which they equate with ‗falsehood‘ or fraud. 
This means that while on the one hand they want people to believe that ‗truth is out there‘ 
which can be used to refute claims about climate change, truth claims by those who support 
claims about climate change are deemed to be of a religious nature, i.e. not amenable to 
checking against the ‗truth‘ held to be out there, or, if checked, found to be wanting. Climate 
sceptics‘ own beliefs in ‗the truth‘ (which climate scientists try to ‗hide‘), namely that there is 
either no climate change or that it is all just part of a natural cycle, are, however, not 
subjected to the same sceptical scrutiny and religious deconstruction. 
Many sceptics also accuse climate scientists not only of ignoring scientific evidence 
in order to support their theories, but also of ignoring the ‗evidence‘ of fraud, which, they 
claim, is staring them in the face in the emails: 
Combined with the ignoring of the evidence of cooking the books from the 
Climategate, this is not exactly anything to inspire confidence in the rationality of the 
Great and Obaminable Church of Glowbull Warming in all its various denominations 
and iterations. (RadioactiveChief, 9 December) 
Even when faced with plausible evidence the whole thing might be a fraud, global 
warming believers simply found a way to assert that evidence was not necessary. (PA 
Pundits, 23 November) 
Some critics then demand that ―the scientific evidence speaks for itself‖ (ShrinkWrapped, 8 
December). This can be positively interpreted as demanding more transparency and access to 
data, but letting the evidence speak for itself is inherently problematic. To whom would this 
scientific evidence ‗speak for itself‘? Who would be able to listen and understand? Scientists, 
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most probably, who have been doing this for decades and who then speak to the public or 
politicians about what the evidence might mean. This meaning is not self-evident. Data do 
not speak for themselves. They have to be interpreted against the backdrop of a theory. Some 
sceptics have rather paradoxical views about this. As one US Senator proclaimed: ―The truth 
is the truth […] The facts are the facts. This whole theory of manmade global warming is just 
that: It is a theory." (Trail Blazers Blog, 8 December). However, it is not ‗just a theory‘. In 
the same way as evolution is not ‗just a theory‘. The senator, like some creationists in the US, 
seems to employ the lay meaning of ‗theory‘, i.e. as a mere hunch or speculation, something 
with no more authoritative status than ‗for argument‘s sake‘. However, theory in science 
means something quite different. ―It is a well-supported, well-documented explanation for 
certain observations. It ties together all the facts about something, providing an explanation 
that fits all the observations and can be used to make predictions‖ (see 
http://www.notjustatheory.com/). So far, the theory of AGW fits that second meaning of 
theory. 
 
Certainty and consensus  
Climate scientists and environmentalists have known for a long time that 
Special interest groups and policymakers opposed to legislative action to reduce human 
emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases often cite ―uncertainty‖ in climate change 
science to justify their position. While there is much uncertainty in climate science (and 
there always will be), many researchers in the field insist that this uncertainty does not 
justify the lack of a policy response. In fact, scientists know a great deal about climate 
change, and there is a strong scientific consensus that the Earth is warming 
significantly, primarily due to human activities.  (Briscoe, 2004) 
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Referencing previous research, for example by Zehr (2000), Antilla (2005) has shown that 
―the popular press uses a number of methods to frame climate science as uncertain, including 
‗through the practice of interjecting and emphasizing controversy or disagreement among 
scientists‘; this often creates drama and provides journalists ‗with a guise of objectivity‘ (p. 
90)‖ (Antilla, 2005: 340; see also Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004; 2007). 
Surprisingly, in framing science as religion, those opposed to political action on climate 
change cited not uncertainty but certainty as the stumbling block: 
We [have] returned to the Dark Age of corruption, delusion, superstition and unreason. 
The Global Warming religion is as virulent and insidious as all mind-bending cults of 
absolute certitude, and yet it has become mainstream orthodoxy and infallible 
spirituality faster than any faith-based cult in history. It has its clerics and its passionate 
prophets; it has its machinery and lucrative industry; it has its urgent way and 
irrefutable truth. It awaits only its messiah. The Copenhagen Summit is the Ecumenical 
Council for the religion of the age. (EU Referendum, 8 December, italics added) 
In this paragraph from a blog which is rather densely populated with religious metaphors, this 
framing is used to claim that climate scientists are being overly confident in the results of 
their studies, (i.e., certain, religiously dogmatic). In this context ‗climategate‘ bloggers also 
tried to undermine what, until ‗climategate‘, had been increasingly regarded as a scientific 
consensus by collocating consensus with ‗manufactured‘ and ‗phony‘ and by comparing it to 
the consensus that surrounded phrenology, eugenics and Piltdown man or comparing it to the 
Loch Ness Monster (see PA Pundits, 23 November; Digital Journal, 8 December). This 
means that the consensus that exists is questioned as a false consensus on the one hand and as 
being too consensual on the other – what many critics call a climate science ‗orthodoxy‘. By 
accusing climate scientists of too much certainty and too much consensus, such bloggers 
imply that some sort of conspiracy must be at work. This is quite different to media coverage 
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of climate change five years earlier. For example, Antilla (2005) found that: ―These press 
reports perpetuate the myth of a lack of international scientific consensus on anthropogenic 
climate change—and thereby succeed in maintaining public confusion.‖ (p. 352) 
Both the older argument, that there should be more certainty, and the newer one, that 
there is too much certainty, make political action impossible and create paralysis. Asking for 
total certainty is based on a rather outdated view of science (Peat, 2002) and in effect asks for 
the impossible. It therefore makes politics - to be regarded as ‗the art of the possible‘ (Otto 
von Bismark, 1867) - impossible. Simultaneously, sceptics attempt to undermine any existing 
consensus (Doran and Kendall Zimmermann, 2009) by framing it in religious terms as 
‗dogmatism‘. This again makes political action impossible, as it undermines the credibility of 
scientists (who are portrayed as priests, clerics, acolytes, fundamentalists and so on). This 
encourages a position of social ―inertia‖, political ―inaction‖ and even ―gridlock‖ (see 
McCright, 2007: 201, 204). This maintains, as Antilla has pointed out, public confusion about 
climate change and contributes to a crisis in climate change communication. 
 
Sound and settled science 
As one of the blogs pointed out: 
The apostles of the religion of anthropogenic global warming desperately want people 
to believe their flimsy theory about the earth warming due to human activity is based 
on science, settled science they tell us, where there is consensus of all scientists with no 
disagreement in the scientific community. (Dakota Voice, 18 December) 
What does ‗settled science‘ mean? When is science (ever) settled, and should it ever be 
settled? In some sense science is never really settled and there is and always should be 
disagreement, as we have seen when discussing certainty. Although there are islands of 
science that are in effect pretty much settled, the scientific process  thrives on unsettling 
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things and quite relishes uncertainty. Researchers are, on the whole, never happier than when 
unsettling somebody else‘s theory or seeing uncertainties that others had not seen before. 
This is quite different to dogmatism and religious belief. 
 
Belief and trust 
As in the case of ‗theory‘, climate sceptics exploit certain meanings of the words ‗belief‘, 
‗believe‘ and ‗believer‘ which are opposed to the way they are commonly used in science, 
and more akin to religious belief. The word 'belief' alone has, as pointed out in the Compact 
Oxford English Dictionary, at least three meanings: 1 a feeling that something exists or is 
true, especially one without proof. 2 a firmly held opinion. 3 (belief in) trust or confidence in. 
4 religious faith (online). Now, the majority of scientists can be said to ‗believe‘ in climate 
change or the theory of AGW in the sense of having confidence in their science, of trusting in 
what they have established and having a firmly held opinion or conviction. This belief is 
based on some sort of empirical ‗proof‘, whereas religious belief generally is not. Some 
religions demand blind faith instead, something that climate critics accuse climate scientists 
of fostering. 
I agree with Aaron Davidson who wrote that ―Science is a belief system which aims to 
minimize faith. Religion, on the other hand, is a belief system based completely on faith. […] 
[In contrast to religion] science has a greater explanatory power, and is open to belief 
revision.‖ (Davidson n. d., online) ‗Climategate‘ ‗believers‘ claim that climate scientists 
produce a type of science that is no longer open to revision and has therefore turned into a 
belief system in the sense of a faith, based on fear and fraud.  
As a result of the exposure of The CRU Papers, we now know that claims of such 
changes were fraudulently fabricated and perpetrated by the priests and believers of the 
fear-mongering climate-change faith system. 
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And, just as fraudulent claims by the false priests of any other fear-mongering religion 
claiming to be saving your soul in some non-confirmable way say nothing about the 
metaphysics of theology, so too the protection-racket extortions being perpetrated by 
the false priests of abnormal climate change say nothing about the epistemology of 
science. […] The AGW movement has been exposed as a religious belief and a 
political cash cow, not science. (Ed Driscoll, 29 November) 
As another blogger wrote, ‗climategate‘ ―[s]uggests that their [scientists‘] predictions now 
are uncheckable, unfalsifiable—in short, not science but faith‖ (Patrick McIlheran: Right On, 
7 December). Some bloggers claim that climate science trumps traditional religions in 
demanding more faith from believers: 
Every religion requires a certain amount of faith or belief, since every religion contains 
at least some claims which cannot be empirically verified.  But in order to believe the 
religion of anthropogenic global warming, adherents put believers in most of the 
traditional religions of the world to shame. (Dakota Voice, 10 December) 
However, in contradiction to the sceptics‘ position, glaciergate demonstrated that climate 
scientists are quite willing to correct, or falsify, claims and not to stick to them like religious 
beliefs.  This –gate followed ‗climategate‘.  It concerned an apparent exaggeration in a 
prediction made about when glaciers in the Himalayas would melt. Scientists involved 
accepted this was the case (see McKie, 2010). 
A concern is that the words 'belief' and 'believe' slip easily into environmental and 
climate science discourses themselves. They also appear in certain branches of the sociology 
of science related to the Strong Programme (see for example Barnes et al., 1996), where both 
science and religion are studied as institutionalised forms of belief or truth. Hence, when 
using words like ‗belief‘ and ‗believe‘ care has to be taken not to allow reinterpretation by 
climate discontents.  
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Confusingly, ‗belief in global warming‘ (in the non-religious sense) has become such a 
common phrase, that people think they can measure it, as CNN did just before the opening of 
COP15, and found that ‗it‘ was decreasing among Republicans in particular (CNN, 2009). 
―Yet casting questions like this as a matter of belief is nonsensical.‖ (Shermer, 2010: 36) 
This loss of ‗belief‘ is certainly not only based on an increase in activity by climate 
sceptics and a loss of trust in science, provoked by hyping up the content of stolen or leaked 
email exchanges between scientists. Economic uncertainties over the costs and benefits of 
Greenhouse gas control have played a major role in framing the policy discourse (Spash 
2007). Certainly there is a distinct possibility that if policy makers had a cheap and 
uncomplicated solution to the problem of climate change, trust in science and belief in the 
honesty, integrity and credibility of scientists and science-based policy would quickly be 
restored, not least among ‗the average American‘. As, Deborah MacKenzie has pointed out, 
―denial finds its most fertile ground in areas where the science must be taken on trust. There 
is no denial of antibiotics, which visibly work.‖ (MacKenzie, 2010: 38) 
 
Conclusions 
Scepticism about climate change has a long tradition and has, for some time, been 
accompanied by framing those who ‗believe‘ in climate change, or who want to mitigate its 
consequences, in religious terms. However, during ‗climategate‘, this religious framing took 
on a new, paradoxical form. Whilst formerly sceptics cited uncertainty in order to undermine 
climate science, some now invoked certainty to challenge it. While in the past they might 
have said that inaction was the right thing because there was not enough of a scientific 
consensus, some now said that there was too much of a consensus and inaction was therefore 
still the right choice. While using rather weak evidence to question the foundations of climate 
policy, they asked for more and more evidence in an infinitely regressing and paralysing 
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search for solid foundations on which to base policy. Finally, while evoking some norms of 
‗real science‘ (see Palin, 2009a), such as objectivity, falsification and the accumulation of 
evidence, sceptics did not apply these norms to their own endeavour. 
Overall, ‗climategate‘ may have damaged public understanding of science and science-
based public policy in two ways. First, by making people think that science is just another 
form of religion the public understanding of and public trust in science are undermined. 
Second, and more importantly, by making people believe that science is based on the pursuit 
of certainty, or universal truth, or on the achievement of an absolute consensus, a very 
outdated understanding of (normal) science is perpetuated. This is what some of the sceptics 
may call ‗commonsense‘ but is an understanding of science that makes public policy 
inherently impossible. 
Public understanding of modern science should rather be based instead on appreciating 
the nature of uncertainty and the impossibility, even undesirability, of establishing universal 
truths. It should also be based on understanding that, as in the case of climate change, politics 
has to be based on taking decisions under conditions of radical uncertainty (even when some 
sort of consensus has been achieved, as in the various IPCC reports). When these decisions 
impinge on the economic certainties of modern citizens, or big business, a debate has to begin 
not about the nature of science but about the nature of values.
16
 As former President of the 
Royal Society, Sir Robert May, said, some years ago, during the debate about genetically 
modified foods: 
This is a debate about values, with science having no special voice except in factual 
clarification of possibilities and constraints. But the task is as hugely difficult as it is 
hugely important. And a large part of the difficulty lies in the uncertainties that are an 
inseparable part of science at the frontier. It helps to recognize, and explicitly 
acknowledge, these uncertainties […]. (May, 2001) 
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In response to ‗climategate‘, Mike Hulme wrote: ―We expect too much certainty, and hence 
clarity, about what should be done. Consequently, we fail to engage in honest and robust 
argument about our competing political visions and ethical values.‖ (Hulme, 2009b)  Climate 
sceptics, who imply through their religious framing of science that ‗belief‘ in climate science 
is unfounded because science is a fraud, obscure the nature of uncertainty in science and 
obfuscate what science (and scientific scepticism) in general is all about. While climate 
science may still have to work through a lot of uncertainties, science as a whole, ‗normal‘ 
science, still produces quite substantial amounts of certain, objective, factual and rather 
useful knowledge. 
This article reveals the threats posed to public understanding of science and to public 
policy by the religious framing of science by climate sceptics. If we want to avert a (climate) 
disaster, we, and this means scientists, teachers, journalists, and metaphor and discourse 
analysts, should try to increase awareness of the dangers of the types of paradoxical 
metaphorical framings used during ‗climategate‘. Metaphors can highlight and hide, clarify 
thought and cloud it. They have many advantages for science and culture, but there are also 
disadvantages. Once metaphors lodge in the imagination, they can successfully eliminate or 
discredit any evidence which might be regarded as contradictory to the dominant framing. 
The metaphors are taken as ‗truths‘. In the debate over action to prevent human induced 
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Notes: Letter A refers to an article in Ottowa Citizen entitled ―Head of UN panel blasts 




                                                 
1
 I shall use ‗climate sceptics‘ here in the sense of ‗climate deniers‘, although there are 
obvious differences between scepticism and denial (see Shermer, 2010; Kemp et al., 2010) 
However, ‗climate sceptic‘ and ‗climatic scepticism‘ were commonly used during the 
‗climategate‘ debate as meaning ‗climate denier‘. 
2
 Together with other so-called ‗gates‘ that followed it, such as ‗Amazongate‘ and 
‗glaciergate‘ – related to claims on how much of the rainforest was under threat from global 
warming and how fast Himalayan glaciers would melt. 
3
 See http://www.uea.ac.uk/mac/comm/media/press/CRUstatements/oxburgh 
4
 Climate mitigation policies rely on much more than science, but the debate about the emails 
focused mostly on science and scientists and their purported collusion with politics and 
politicians. 
5
 I follow the convention established in cognitive linguistics (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) 
according to which one indicates so-called conceptual metaphors, such as ARGUMENTS ARE 
WAR, in small capitals. Conceptual metaphors are overarching ways of conceptualising 
relatively abstract ideas in more concrete ways, and subsume metaphorical expressions such 
as ‗She shot down his argument‘, ‗He surrendered to her brilliant repartee‘, ‗They fought 
hard over the last issue‘, etc. 
6
 Google explains the graph in the following way: ―Google Trends analyzes a portion of 
Google web searches to compute how many searches have been done for the terms you enter, 
relative to the total number of searches done on Google over time. We then show you a graph 
with the results – our Search Volume Index graph. Located beneath the Search Volume Index 
graph is our News reference volume graph. This graph shows you the number of times your 
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topic appeared in Google News stories. When Google Trends detects a spike in the volume of 
news stories for a particular search term, it labels the graph and displays the headline of an 
automatically selected Google News story written near the time of that spike. Currently, only 
English-language headlines are displayed, but we hope to support non-English headlines in 
the future.‖ (http://www.google.com/intl/en/trends/about.html#1) 
7
 This echoes a comment he made in 2004, reported in Antilla (2005): ―Republican Senator 
James Inhofe of Oklahoma (2004, S11292), on the floor of the Senate, proclaimed (as he also 
had in 2003) that ‗Global warming is the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American 




 Where Sarah Palin, the Republican nominee for Vice President of the United States in 2008, 
first expressed her thoughts on ‗climategate‘ (Palin, 2009a); she published further thoughts in 
the Washington Post (Palin, 2009b) 
10
 See: http://eureferendum.blogspot.com/2005/03/euroscepticism-in-world.html 
11
 See: http://papundits.wordpress.com/ 
12
 See: http://www.dakotavoice.com/ 
13
 See: http://rightwingnews.com/ 
14
 See: http://www.smalldeadanimals.com/ 
15
 See: http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Denialosphere 
16
 This might be discussed under the heading of ‗post-normal science‘. Although there was no 
reference to this in my corpus of blogs, there are blogs on the web that do discuss 
‘climategate‘ through the lense of post-normal science, such as a contribution by Ravetz to 
the blog that was involved in starting the ‗climategate‘ debate, Watts Up with That (see 
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Ravetz, 2010). For further information on studies relating to climate change, values and 
ethics in the context of post-normal science, see Funtowizc and Ravetz (1994); Spash (2002). 
 
